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Speak Softly and Carry a Big Commerce
Clause: General Motors Corp. v. Director of
Revenue
General Motors Corp. v. Director ofRevenue'
I. INTRODUCTION
The effect of General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue ("GM Corp.")
may well spread beyond the confines of the Missouri state line. Because the
case applies United States Supreme Court precedent to a new constitutional
problem, other states may look to it for aid in interpreting similar statutory
provisions. There has, after all, been both judicial and scholarly debate
concerning how strictly the Commerce Clause should be interpreted with regard
to tax incentives and benefits.2 GM Corp. makes clear that the debate is over in
Missouri. The Commerce Clause will function as a sword for Missouri courts
to prevent Missouri from becoming involved in an interstate commerce brawl
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
General Motors Group ("GM Group") attempted to file Missouri
consolidated income tax returns in 1990, 1991, and 1992.4 The Director of
Revenue, upon receipt of the consolidated returns and the refund requests,
decided that GM Group was not eligible to file consolidated returns.5 Under
Section 143.431.3(1) of the Missouri Revised Statutes, Missouri required a
corporation to obtain at least fifty percent of its total income from Missouri
sources in order to be eligible to file a consolidated return.6 The Director also
1. 981 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1998).
2. See infra Part V. While this case deals with what has typically been called a tax
benefit or incentive, this Note suggests in Part V that this might be better characterized
as a location incentive.
3. See infra Part V.
4. GM Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 562. GM Group consists of General Motors
Corporation (domiciled in Detroit, Michigan but incorporated in Delaware) as well as
about 300 subsidiaries. Id. From 1990 to 1992, GM Group transacted a considerable
amount of business in Missouri. Id. "[GM Group] had approximately $1.3 billion in
property, $300 million in payroll, and $2.3 billion in gross receipts in Missouri for each
of the three years." Id. at 563. In fact, GM conducted so much business in Missouri that
it requested refunds on its Missouri tax returns of $3,651,703 in 1990 and $1,172,400 in




LeMoine: LeMoine: Speak Softly and Carry a Big Commerce Clause:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
rejected GM Group's requests for refunds and "issued a notice of deficiency
against GM in the amount of $12,533,176 for 1992." 7
GM Group appealed the Director's decision to the Administrative Hearing
Commission ("AHC"), asserting that Section 143.431.3(1) was unconstitutional
because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.8 The
AHC upheld the Director's decision, but found that GM Group was not liable for
any Missouri income tax in 1992.' The AHC did not rule on any of the
constitutional issues because it did not have power to decide such issues." GM
Group then appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, claiming that Section
143.431.3(1) discriminated against interstate commerce."
Section 143.431.3(1) sets out the conditions under which an "affiliated
group of corporations" may file a consolidated income tax return. The statute
reads in relevant part:
If an affiliated group of corporations files a consolidated income tax
return for the taxable year for federal income tax purposes and fifty
percent or more of its income is derived from sources within this state
as determined in accordance with section 143.45 1, then it may elect to
file a Missouri consolidated income tax return.'2
An affiliated group of corporations that files a consolidated tax return receives
a considerable tax advantage because it is treated as one corporation for tax
purposes. 3 This allows such a group of corporations to "offset the gains of one
or more of its companies ... which may result in lower tax. In addition, filing
a consolidated return is administratively more convenient than filing separate
returns."
14
GM Group argued that Section 143.451 violated the Commerce Clause
because the fifty percent requirement discriminated against interstate
commerce.'5 The Director of Revenue, according to GM Group, used the fifty
percent requirement to deny GM Group a tax benefit based simply on its
7. Id.
8. Id. GM Group also appealed on other federal and state constitutional bases, but
the case was decided solely under the Commerce Clause. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. See State Tax Comm'n v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d
69, 75-76 (Mo. 1982).
11. Id. Under the MISSOURi CONSTITUTION art. V, § 3, the court had originaljurisdiction because the matter involved construction of revenue laws of the state. Id. at
562.
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 143.431.3(1) (1994).
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corporate form and the geographic location of the majority of its business
activities."
The Missouri Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Judge Covington,
held that Section 143.431.3(1) violated the United States Constitution, article I,
section 8, because it discriminated against interstate commerce.' 7 The court
based its reasoning on Commerce Clause precedent from the United States
Supreme Court. Specifically, the court determined that Kraft General Foods,
Inc. v. Iowa Department ofRevenue & Finance governed the case. 8 Relying on
Kraft, the court overruled Williams Co. v. Director ofRevenue 9 to the extent that




In GM Corp., the Missouri Supreme Court discussed many of the United
States Supreme Court cases relevant to its determination. However, the Court
gave little attention to the Missouri Supreme Court case it overruled, Williams
Co. v. Director of Revenue,2 which held Section 143.431.3(1) constitutional.
In Williams, Williams Company ("Williams") and seven of its subsidiaries
that had conducted business in Missouri from 1982 to 1984 sought the right to
file consolidated Missouri income tax returns.22 The Department of Revenue and
the AHC determined that Williams and its subsidiaries were not eligible to file
consolidated returns for those years because they did not meet the fifty percent
requirement in Section 143.431.3.' Williams appealed to the Missouri Supreme
Court, arguing that Section 143.431.3 violated the Commerce Clause because
"the fifty percent 'source of income' requirement of the statute discriminate[d]
against interstate commerce." 24 The court held that the statutory provision did
not violate the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, the court interpreted the
statutory provision to be an attempt by the Missouri legislature to ensure that
16. Id. at 563.
17. Id. at 568.
18. Id. at 565; Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S. 71
(1992).
19. 799 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991).
20. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 567 (Mo.
1998).
21. 799 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1990).
22. Id. at 603.




LeMoine: LeMoine: Speak Softly and Carry a Big Commerce Clause:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
MISSOURILAWREVIEW
Missouri's taxation scheme did not tax income derived from non-Missouri
sources.' The court further stated:
[F]ormula apportionment of the income of a unitary affiliated group
is more likely to be "fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory,
sufficiently connected with the taxpayer's state activities, and fairly
related to state benefits provided the taxpayer" when the affiliated
group derives the majority of its income from in-state sources.
Conversely, when the unitary group's income derives primarily from
sources outside the state, formula apportionment of the income of only
those subsidiaries with direct relationships to the State yields a corpus
of income more reasonably related to the group's activities within the
state.
26
According to the court, simply because Williams organized its company in a
manner that was not advantageous for tax purposes did not mean that the fifty
percent requirement violated the Commerce Clause. Second, the court stated
that Section 143.431.3 did not additionally tax appellants simply because of their
interstate activities. Instead, Williams was burdened because the statutory
provision did not allow Williams to consolidate losses incurred by subsidiaries
outside of Missouri with gains realized in Missouri.28 However, Missouri's
practice of not allowing "consolidation of losses ... when there is no clear
nexus" between the losses of subsidiaries outside Missouri and the gains by
subsidiaries within Missouri did not discriminate against interstate commerce.29
25. The court stated that "formula apportionment and separate accounting" are
"imperfect proxies for an ideal which is not only difficult to achieve in practice, but also
difficult to describe in theory." Id. at 605. The Commerce Clause demands that states
impose taxes on activities with a "substantial nexus with the taxing state." Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980). Taxes must be "fairly
apportioned" and nondiscriminatory in their effect on interstate commerce, and must be
"fairly related to the services provided by the State." Id.
26. Williams, 799 S.W.2d at 605 (citing Mid-America Television Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 652 S.W.2d 674, 680-81 (Mo. 1983) (internal citations omitted).
27. Williams Co. v. Director of Revenue, 799 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Mo. 1990).
28. Id.
29. Id. Prior to Williams, Mid-America Television Co., 652 S.W.2d at 680, upheld
Section 143.431.3. In Mid-America, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
A group deriving less than half of its income from sources within this state
can hardly be said to be conducting a unitary business within the state. It is
not unreasonable for Missouri to decline to accord such a group the same tax
treatment available to a single entity performing all or most of its business
operations herein. This is especially true since the state is only allowed to tax
corporations on income derived from sources within this state. The state has
little reason to treat an affiliated group as a single taxpaying entity when less
than 50 percent of the group's income is derived from sources within the
[Vol. 65
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/15
DISCRIMINATORY TAXVINCENTIVES
B. Reorganization or Relocation Will Not Save an Unconstitutional
Burden
The Missouri Supreme Court found Section 143.431.3 unconstitutional
based on its interpretation of Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of
Revenue.3" In Kraft, Kraft General Foods, Inc. ("Kraft") conducted a "unitary
business" in the United States and other countries.3" The operation of this
business subjected Kraft to tax liability in Iowa.32 Pursuant to the Iowa Business
Tax on Corporations, Iowa taxed dividends received from foreign subsidiaries
but did not tax dividends received from domestic subsidiaries.33 Kraft
challenged this practice under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 34 The Supreme
Court stated that application of the Iowa tax depended on both the domicile and
the location of the subsidiaries and their business activities.35 As a result, the
only dividends taxed were those "reflecting the foreign business activity of
state, since the income earned by the members of the group outside the state
is beyond the state's power to tax.... The fact that more tax may be owed
to the state of Missouri by one corporation under one set of circumstances
rather than another, without some showing of discrimination or arbitrary or
unreasonable classification, is not sufficient to support appellants' claim of
constitutional infirmities.
Id. at 681. This case did not involve a Commerce Clause challenge, although its
reasoning is instructive to this Note.
30. 505 U.S. 71 (1992). Note that the Court did not exclusively base its reasoning
on Kraft. The remainder of the opinion's legal background can be found infra Part
III(C).
31. Id. at 72.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 72-73.
34. Id. at 73. The Foreign Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination by states
against foreign commerce. The Court in Kraft noted:
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434... (1979), we
concluded that the constitutional prohibition against state taxation of foreign
commerce is broader than the protection afforded to interstate commerce, in
part because matters of concern to the entire Nation are implicated. Like the
Import-Export Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause recognizes that
discriminatory treatment of foreign commerce may create problems, such as
the potential for international retaliation, that concern the Nation as a whole.
Id. at 79 (citations omitted). Japan Line held that "when a State seeks to tax the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce, two additional considerations, beyond those
articulated in [the doctrine governing the Interstate Commerce Clause], come into play."
Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. 434,446 (1979). "The first is the enhanced risk of multiple
taxation.... The second additional consideration.., is the possibility that a state tax will
'impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."' Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185-86 (1983) (quoting Japan Line,
Ltd., 441 U.S- at 448) (citations omitted).
35. Kraft, 505 U.S. 71 at 76.
2000]
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foreign subsidiaries. 36 Iowa argued that Kraft could avoid this tax liability by
changing its corporate structure.37 The Court rejected this argument, concluding
that there is "no authority for the. . . proposition... that a tax that does
discriminate against foreign commerce may be upheld if a taxpayer could avoid
that discrimination by changing the domicile of the corporations through which
it conducts its business."38 Iowa further argued that the statute did not violate the
Foreign Commerce Clause because Iowa subsidiaries were not treated more
favorably under the tax system than subsidiaries elsewhere.39 The Court also
rejected this argument, stating that favorable treatment of domestic (in this case
Iowa) corporations was not necessary to prove a violation of the Foreign
Commerce Clause.40 According to the Court, "the constitutional prohibition
against state taxation of foreign commerce is broader than the protection
afforded to interstate commerce in part because matters of concern to the entire
Nation are implicated."41 The Court concluded its opinion by stating that "[t]he
Iowa statute cannot withstand [Commerce Clause] scrutiny, for it facially
discriminates against foreign commerce and therefore violates the Foreign
Commerce Clause. 42
36. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S. 71, 77 n.19 (1992).
37. Id. at 77-78. Iowa was joined by amicus.
38. Id. at 78.
39. Id. at 78-79.
40. Id. at 79.
41. Id. (citation omitted). The Court further rejected the proposition that foreign
commerce discrimination can be justified by the fact that the United States Government
and States impose burdens on domestic subsidiaries that offset the burden imposed by
Iowa upon foreign commerce. Id. at 80-8 1. And finally, the Court rejected the argument
that Iowa could "facially discriminate against foreign commerce" because of a
"compelling justification"--the administrative convenience "of having state forms and
auditing procedures [which] replicate federal practice." Id.
42. Id. at 82.
[Vol. 65
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C. The Rest of the Story-Prohibitions on Discriminatory State
Legislation in Violation of the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause,43 not unlike other important federal constitutional
provisions, has generated a wealth of case law concerning its interpretation and
application. However, following the example of GM Group, it is helpful to
consider only a small sampling of these cases.
In 1977, in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, the Supreme
Court examined a New York statutory amendment that imposed higher taxes on
securities transactions occurring outside the state.' In determining that the
amendment violated the Commerce Clause by "impos[ing] an unequal tax
burden on out-of-state sales in order to protect an in-state business," the Court
articulated the essential structure for Commerce Clause analysis with respect to
discriminatory tax burdens. 45 "[T]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause [is]
to create an area of free trade among the several States." 6 The Commerce
Clause acts as a limitation on the power of the States to tax interstate
commerce.47 However, the Clause does not restrict the "reserved "power of the
States to tax for the support of their own governments."'" The challenge for the
Court in adjudicating Commerce Clause cases is to find the balance between
limiting the States' power and allowing them to exercise the reserved power
inherent in principles of federalism.49 Because courts generally adjudicate
Commerce Clause cases on a case-by-case basis, there is "'much room for
controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in
the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation."' 5 The fundamental
43. The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONsTTUTION, art. I, § 8, has generally been seen
by the United States Supreme Court in the following light:
We have subsequently endorsed Justice Johnson's appraisal of the central
importance of federal control over interstate and foreign commerce and, more
narrowly, his conclusion that the Commerce Clause had not only granted
Congress express authority to override restrictive and conflicting commercial
regulations adopted by the States, but that it also had immediately effected a
curtailment of state power. "In short, the Commerce Clause even without
implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the
States.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 502 U.S. 564,572 (1997)
(quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946)).
44. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 319 (1977).
45. Id. at 328.
46. Id. (quoting McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944)).
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824)).
49. Id. at 328-29.
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principle which must guide the Court in these determinations is the following:
"No State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may 'impose a tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce... by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business.' 5' In Boston, the Court concluded that because the
New York statutory amendment at issue "impose[d] a greater tax liability on out-
of-state sales than on in-state sales, [it] falls short of the substantially
evenhanded treatment demanded by the Commerce Clause."52 The Court will
not sanction statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce even if the
statutes are "pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest."53 The Court concluded
its analysis by stating:
Our decision today does not prevent the States from structuring their
tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate
commerce and industry. Nor do we hold that a State may not compete
with other States for a share of interstate commerce; such competition
lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We hold only that in the process
of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products
manufactured or the business operations performed in any other
State.54
The Supreme Court elaborated on its Commerce Clause jurisprudence in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.55 In Complete Auto Transit, Complete
Auto Transit challenged a Mississippi sales tax that had been assessed against
it for the privilege of doing business in Mississippi.56 The Court adopted a new
test for adjudicating Commerce Clause cases and disregarded what had been
known as the Spector ruleY.5 The Spector rule stated:
[W]here a taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate and interstate
commerce, a state may tax the privilege of carrying on intrastate
business and, within reasonable limits, may compute the amount of the
51. Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., 358 U.S. at 458)
(omission in original).
52. Id. at 332.
A state may no more use discriminatory taxes to assure that nonresidents
direct their commerce to businesses within the State than to assure that
residents trade only in intrastate commerce. As we stated at the outset, the
fundamental purpose of the Clause is to assure that there be free trade among
the several States.
Id. at 334-35.
53. Id. at 336.
54. Id. at 336-37.
55. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
56. Id. at 274.
57. Id. at 288-89; Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
[Vol. 65
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/15
DISCRIMINATORY TAX INCENTIVES
charge by applying the tax rate to a fair proportion of the taxpayer's
business done within the state, including both interstate and
intrastate."
Spector held that a state may not tax the privilege of doing business when that
tax applies only to interstate commerce. 9 Application of the Spector rule led to
the triumph of form over substance; and, by 1977, the Court had become
dissatisfied with the operation of the Spector rule.60 Simply put, "the Spector
rule [no longer addressed] the problems with which the Commerce Clause is-
concerned."'" Therefore, instead of relying on the semantic formalism of
Spector, which made all taxes on the "privilege of carrying on interstate
commerce" unconstitutional per se, the Court fashioned a more acceptable test.62
The Complete Auto Transit test, as it has become known, sustains "against
Commerce Clause challenge [a tax that is] applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.,
63
58. Spector, 340 U.S. at 609-10.
59. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,284 (1977).
60. Id. at 281, 284-85. The Court stated that the unsatisfactory operation of the
Spector rule was exemplified in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
Louisiana assessed a franchise tax against Colonial for the privilege of doing business
in Louisiana. Colonial was a Delaware corporation which operated a pipeline through
Louisiana and employed a number ofpersons to operate various pump stations across the
pipeline. Colonial did no intrastate business. Traigle, 421 U.S. at 101-02. The
Louisiana Court of Appeal held the tax was unconstitutional in violation of the Spector
rule. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
The Louisiana Legislature, perhaps recognizing that it had run afoul of a rule
of words rather than a rule of substance, then redrafted the statute to levy the
tax, as an alternative incident, on the 'qualification to carry on or do business
in this state or the actual doing of business within this state in a corporate
form.' Again, the Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as applied to
the appellant.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 286- (1977) (quoting Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Agerton, 275 So. 2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 1973)) (internal citations omitted).
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, overruled this decision and held the tax
constitutional. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Agerton, 289 So. 2d 93 (La. 1974). The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100
(1975). The Court distinguished Spector from Colonial in that Spector dealt with a tax
on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce, while the "Louisiana Legislature.
. had worded the statute at issue 'narrowly to confine the impost to one related to
appellant's activities within the State in the corporate form."' Id. at 113-14.
61. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 288.
62. Id. at 288-89.
63. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, 490 U.S. 66, 72 (1989).
2000]
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In 1984, the Court decided Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully,64 which
involved a dispute over the constitutionality of a New York statute granting
franchise tax credits to "Domestic International Sales Corporations" ("DISC"). 65
The case involved a New York statute enacted in response to changes in the
United States Internal Revenue Code. Congress, in order to "provide tax
incentives for U.S. firms to increase their exports,"' recognized certain
corporations as DISCs. 67
A corporation qualifies as a DISC if substantially all its assets and
gross receipts are export-related. Under federal law, a DISC is not
taxed on its income. Instead, a portion of the DISC's income-labeled
"deemed distributions"--is attributed to the DISC's shareholders on
a current basis, whether or not that portion is actually paid or
distributed to them. Under the statutory provisions in effect during the
calendar years 1972 and 1973 . . ., 50% of a DISC's income was
deemed distributed to its shareholders. Taxes on the remaining
income of the DISC-labeled "accumulated DISC income"--are
deferred until either that accumulated income is actually distributed to
the shareholders or the DISC no longer qualifies for special tax
treatment.68
New York's response required the "consolidation of the receipts, assets,
expenses, and liabilities of the DISC with those of its parent., 69 The parent
would then be charged a franchise tax based on the consolidated amount.7"
However, the parent qualified for a tax credit (called a DISC export credit),
provided that the DISC of the parent conducted a substantial amount of business
(i.e. shipping activity) in New York.7' Westinghouse challenged this statutory
provision as unfairly apportioned and discriminatory against interstate commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause.72 The Supreme Court held that the tax
scheme was fairly apportioned, but that the "Tax Commission's argument that
New York employs a constitutionally acceptable allocation formula... serves
only to obscure the issue. '73 According to the Court, the fact that the tax scheme
is fairly apportioned 74 does not mean that it is nondiscriminatory.75 Referring
64. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
65. Id. at 390.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 390-92.
69. Id. at 393.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 393-94.
72. Id. at 395-96.
73. Id. at 398.
74. Fair or constitutional apportioning of a state's tax burden requires that the state
[Vol. 65
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back to the basic analytical structure articulated in Boston Stock Exchange, the
Court would not allow New York to give New York businesses an advantage
through the use of discriminatory tax preferences.76 The Court concluded:
"When a tax, on its face, is designed to have discriminatory economic effects,
the Court 'need not know how unequal the [t]ax is before concluding that it
unconstitutionally discriminates.',
77
In 1987, the Court confronted American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner,7 a
case involving state taxes on interstate motor carriers. 79 The Court recognized
that Commerce Clause jurisprudence had left in its wake an "uneven course of
decisions... reflect[ing] the difficulties of reconciling unrestricted access to the
national market with each State's authority to collect its fair share of revenues
from interstate commercial activity."80 In American Trucking, the Court applied
what is known as the "internal consistency" test.8' To pass this test, "a state tax
must be of a kind that, 'if applied by every jurisdiction, there would be no
impermissible interference with free trade."'8, 2 Under this test, the tax at issue
in American Trucking did not pass muster because if the tax were applied by
other jurisdictions, interstate commerce would be restricted.83
In 1989, the Court decided Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director.4 Thirteen
large oil companies brought suit against New Jersey, alleging that the State's
"does not undertake to tax any interstate activities carried on outside the state's borders."
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
75. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 399 (1984).
76. Id. at 406. The Court stated that "a State may not encourage the development
of local industry by means of taxing measures that 'invite a multiplication of preferential
trade areas' within the United States in contravention of the Commerce Clause." Id. at
405.
77. Id. at 406-07 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981)).
78. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
79. Pennsylvania assessed "annual taxes on the operation of trucks and truck
tractors .... Because Pennsylvania provided a reduction in registration fees designed to
offset the lump-sum tax for vehicles registered in Pennsylvania, the practical effect of the
statute was to tax only vehicles registered out of state." General Motors Corp. v. Director
of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1998).
80. American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 269.
81. Id. at 282-88.
82. Id. at 284 (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984)).
83. Id. at 284. The Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against out-of-state
businesses based on their geographic location. Id. at 286. Justice O'Connor disagreed
with the Court's application of the "internal consistency" test. Id. at 303 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). She argued that Armco could only be read as stating "that a tax that is
facially discriminatory is unconstitutional if it is not 'internally consistent."' Id. She
believed that the majority had conjured up the internal consistency test and was engaging
in an "entirely novel enterprise." Id.
84. 490 U.S. 66 (1989).
2000]
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Corporation Business Tax discriminated against interstate commerce.85
Employing the Complete Auto Transit four-part test for adjudicating Commerce
Clause challenges, the Court determined that even if the New Jersey tax was
fairly apportioned, it could still discriminate against interstate commerce.16 The
Court stated that "a tax may violate the Commerce Clause if it is facially
discriminatory, has a discriminatory intent, or has the effect of unduly burdening
interstate commerce."87 The Court concluded that the New Jersey tax did not run
afoul of the Commerce Clause because it passed the Complete Auto Transit
test.8
In 1994, the Court decided two important Commerce Clause cases-
Associated Industries v. Lohman 9 and West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.9"
Both cases involved "privilege" taxes that taxed companies for storing (Lohman)
or bringing into the state (West Lynn Creamery) out-of-state products. In
Lohman, Missouri argued that its use tax, imposed uniformly across the state on
"goods purchased outside the State and stored, used, or consumed within the
State," was compensatory in that it made up for the sales taxes that localities
imposed on the sale of goods within those localities.9' The Court disagreed,
citing the primary purpose of the Commerce Clause-prohibiting economic
protectionism.9 Although "compensatory taxes" are not prohibited by the
Commerce Clause (because of the notion that interstate commerce must pay its
own way),93 the Missouri use tax was not compensatory because it exceeded
compensatory purposes and became discriminatory. 94 A tax is no longer
compensatory when it exceeds the local tax for which it is designed to
compensate.
Under our cases, unless one of several narrow bases of justification is
shown, actual discrimination, wherever it is found, is impermissible,
and the magnitude and scope of the discrimination have no bearing on
the determinative question whether discrimination has occurred.96
85. Id. at 68.
86. Id. at 74-75.
87. Id. at 75. See generally Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388
(1984) (facially discriminatory); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)
(discriminatory intent); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987)
(discriminatory effect).
88. See generally Amerada Hess Corp., 490 U.S. at 73-79.
89. 511 U.S. 641 (1994).
90. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
91. Lohman, 511 U.S. at 643.
92. Id. at 647.
93. Id. at 648.
94. Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 648 (1994).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 649-50 (internal citation omitted).
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In West Lynn Creamery, the Court invalidated "premium payments" which,
when combined with the subsidy given only to Massachusetts milk-producers,
effectively made out-of-state milk more expensive than Massachusetts-produced
milk.97 Because the program "neutraliz[ed] advantages belonging to the place
of origin,"9' it was unconstitutional.99
In 1996, the Court, in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,'°° invalidated North
Carolina's "'intangibles tax' on the fair market value of corporate stock owned
by North Carolina residents or having a 'business, commercial, or taxable situs'
in the State."' '1 The tax was assessed uniformly across the state, but residents
could take tax deductions based on the amount of business the corporation
conducted in North Carolina. °2 Quoting from Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Department ofEnvironmental Quality,"°3 the Court stated that its first step was
to detennine if the statute "regulate[d] evenhandedly with only 'incidental'
effects on interstate commerce, or discriminate[d] against interstate
commerce.""°4 The Court's analysis led it to hold that the statute facially
97. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. .186, 194 (1994).
98. Id. at 196 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
99. Id. at 196. The Court rejected the following arguments by Massachusetts:
(A) Because each component of the program-a local subsidy and a
nondiscriminatory tax-is valid, the combination of the two is equally valid;
(B) The dealers who pay the order premiums (the tax) are not competitors of
the farmers who receive disbursements from the Dairy Equalization Fund, so
the pricing order is not discriminatory; (C) The pricing order is not
protectionist, because the costs of the program are borne only by
Massachusetts dealers and consumers, and the benefits are distributed
exclusively to Massachusetts farmers; and (D) The order's incidental burden
on commerce is justified by the local benefit of saving the dairy industry from
collapse.
Id. at 198. The court stated:
The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.
In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack,
whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination
against interstate commerce.
Id. at 201.
100. 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
101. Id. at 327.
102. Id. at 328.
Thus, a corporation doing all of its business within the State would pay
corporate income tax on 100% of its income, and the taxable percentage
deduction allowed to resident owners of that corporation's stock under the
intangibles tax would likewise be 100%. Stock in a corporation doing no
business in North Carolina... would be taxable on 100% of its value.
Id.
103. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
104. Fulton Corp, 516 U.S. at 331 (quoting Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99).
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discriminated against interstate commerce." Such a statute, according to the
Court, is "virtually per se invalid."2 6 A tax that facially discriminates against
interstate commerce can be justified only if the State proves that the tax is
compensatory."'
Finally, in 1997, the Supreme Court decided Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town ofHarrison."18 Camps Newfound/Owatonna ("Camps") challenged
a Maine statute that gave a "general exemption from real estate and personal
property taxes for 'benevolent and charitable institutions incorporated' in the
State"' 9 on the ground that a corporation (like Camps) which operated its
principal business for out-of-state customers only qualified for a "more limited
tax benefit."' The Court determined that it was clear from the face of the
statute that it discriminated against interstate commerce. The statute clearly
discriminated between camps serving in-state versus out-of-state customers by
giving the camps serving in-state customers tax benefits while burdening the
camps serving out-of-state customers. This unconstitutionally penalized
"nonresident customers" of the camps."'
D. Conclusion
The above cases provide the framework necessary for understanding the
legal issue in GM Corp. Kraft teaches that a state statute may not avoid a
Commerce Clause challenge if a business may reorganize or relocate in order to
take advantage of a tax benefit."' The cases discussed above articulate the
purpose of the Commerce Clause-"to create an area of free trade among the
... States.""'  The Court's role in adjudicating Commerce Clause cases is to
balance federalism concerns with interstate commerce concerns.114 Thus, the
real difficulty in adjudicating Commerce Clause cases is that the cases are
decided on a case-by-case basis and leave a confusing trail of precedent for
courts to follow.""
One result of this case-by-case approach is that the Court has fashioned
different tests throughout its Commerce Clause analysis. Recall that the Court
replaced the Spector test with the Complete Auto Transit test"6 and "conjured
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99).
107. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996).
108. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
109. Id. at 567-68.
110. Id. at 568.
111. Id. at 578-79.
112. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992).
113. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977).
114. Id. at 328-29.
115. Id. at 329.
116. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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up" the internal consistency test in American Trucking.117 Another result of this
approach is that the Court continually distills governing principles in its
Commerce Clause precedent. For instance, the Court has determined that
whether apportionment is fair and whether a statute is discriminatory are two
separate inquiries." 8 Discrimination against out-of-state businesses based on
geographic location is not tolerated under the Commerce Clause." 9 And statutes
may be defective if they are facially discriminatory, have discriminatory intent,
or have a discriminatory effect.
20
Several other important principles have risen to the top in Commerce
Clausejurisprudence. Interstate commerce must pay its own way, and therefore
compensatory taxes are constitutional ifthey are truly compensatory.' 2 ' Whether
there is a large or small amount of discrimination is irrelevant-all
discrimination is equally unconstitutional." State taxes may not negate business
advantages based on location in other states. 23 The test for discrimination is a
practical one.124 Facial discrimination against interstate commerce is "virtually
per se invalid."" Finally, statutes may not discriminate against businesses based
on their participation in interstate commerce. 126
IV. INSTANT DECISION
After marching through much of the above precedent, the Missouri
Supreme Court in GM Group held that because Section 143.431.3(1) "expressly
distinguished between affiliated groups that perform the majority of their
business activities in Missouri and groups that perform the majority of their
business activities out of state,"'127 the statute discriminated against interstate
commerce. 28 The court analogized the statute to the one overruled in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna,129 where the statute discriminated between camps
servicing out-of-state patrons and in-state patrons for purposes of assessing a tax
benefit. 30
117. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 282-88 (1987).
118. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 399 (1984).
119. Id. at 286.
120. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, 490 U.S. 66, 75 (1989).
121. Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 648 (1994).
122. Id. at 649-50.
123. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 196 (1994).
124. Id. at 201.
125. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996).
126. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
127. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Mo.
1998).
128. Id.
129. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 575-76.
130. GM Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 564; see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S.
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The court further stated that the Missouri statute penalized GM Group
because, while GM Group conducted a substantial amount of business in
Missouri, most of its business was transacted elsewhere.' Therefore, because
GM Group did not perform fifty percent of its business in Missouri, GM Group
could not file a consolidated return in Missouri.'32 As the Supreme Court held
in Westinghouse, statutes which provide incentives to businesses to conduct
more business in a state facially discriminate against interstate commerce.
1 33
According to the court, the Missouri statute further discriminated against GM
Group based on its geographic location. 34 As the Supreme Court held in
Amerada Hess Corp.'35 and in American Trucking,136 taxes which discriminate
based on geographic location violate the Commerce Clause. 37  Finally, the
Commerce Clause prohibits tax schemes which discriminate against corporations
(or other businesses) based upon their corporate structure. 38 The fact that GM
Group might have been able to take advantage of the consolidated return if it had
changed its corporate structure and its geographic location had no constitutional
force. Such discrimination is "an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce."
39
The court then went on to deal with the arguments advanced by the Director
ofRevenue 4° The Director first argued that Williams controlled the disposition
of the case. The court determined that the Williams decision upheld Section
143.431.3(1) on two grounds: (1) the tax "was designed to tax income
reasonably related to an affiliated group's in-state activities and does not result
in additional tax liability for groups that do not meet the statute's requirements,"
and (2) the tax was non-discriminatory because Williams could have avoided the
burden placed upon it by restructuring its corporate form or by doing more
business in Missouri. 4 ' In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Kraft, the
court determined that the fact that GM Group could have restructured its
at 575-76.
131. Id. at 566.
132. Id. at 567.
133. Id. at 566; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407
(1984).
134. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 567 (Mo.
1998).
135. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, 490 U.S. 66 (1989).
136. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
137. Amerada, 490 U.S. at 77; American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 286.
138. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
139. GM Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 566.
140. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 566-68 (Mo.
1998).
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corporate form or changed its domicile no longerjustified the statute's otherwise
facially discriminatory nature. 42
After the [Kraft] decision, the Williams analysis is no longer valid.
The fifty-percent requirement of section 143.431.3(1) favors
businesses that conduct the majority of their business in Missouri and
penalizes primarily out-of-state businesses. Affiliated groups such as
GM Group are deprived of a valuable tax benefit merely because of
their corporate form and the geographic location of their businesses.43
The Court therefore overruled Williams to the extent that it held Section
143.431.3(1) constitutional.
The Director advanced three other arguments in support of Section
143.431.3(1), all of which were rejected by the Court. First, the Director argued
that because the statute "neither impose[d] a tax nor grant[ed] a tax credit," it did
not burden interstate commerce. 44 But, as the Supreme Court held in West Lynn
Creamery, the right to take advantage of a tax or commercial benefit (through
filing a consolidated return or other means) is protected by the Commerce
Clause.'45 It is impermissible for a statute to constrain the ability of a firm
participating in interstate commerce to take advantage of such benefits simply
because of such participation.'46 Because GM Group "[was] placed at a
competitive disadvantage when it [was] denied the tax benefits that section
143.431.3(1) confer[red]," the statute "impermissibly discriminate[d] against
interstate commerce."' 47
Second, the Director argued that Section 143.431.3(1) properly apportioned
Missouri's tax burden based on the amount of business activities that took place
in Missouri. 48 Because of the proper apportionment requirement in the
Complete Auto Transit,149 Section 143.431.3(1) was permissible under the
Commerce Clause because it was necessary to determine the amount of a firm's
Missouri taxable income.' 50 But, recalling Westinghouse, the Missouri Supreme
Court stated that "[a] determination that a states method of apportionment is
constitutionally sound does not foreclose a determination of whether the state's
142. GM Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 566.
143. Id. at 566-67.
144. Id. at 567.
145. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 196 (1994).
146. GM Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 567; see also West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at
201.
147. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 567 (Mo.
1998).
148. Id.
149. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
150. GM Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 567.
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tax scheme discriminates against interstate commerce."' 5' Because Section
143.431.3(1) placed a preliminary requirement upon businesses-that they
derive a majority of their total income from Missouri before they could file a
consolidated return-the statute discriminated against interstate commerce
because "it foreclose[d] interstate commerce-neutral decisions and create[d] both
an advantage for businesses that conduct[ed] the majority of their business in
Missouri and a penalty for businesses that conduct[ed] the majority of their
business outside Missouri.'
' 52
The Director's third argument hinged on the internal consistency test found
in American Trucking. 53 The Director argued that the apportionment scheme
found in Section 143.431.3(1) passed the internal consistency test "because even
if a group is not allowed to file a consolidated return, each individual corporation
within the group would still have its tax liability fairly apportioned.' ' 54 This
argument, according to the Missouri Supreme Court, did not take into account
that the problem with the statute was the fifty percent threshold requirement, not
the apportionment scheme. 55 Applying the internal consistency test to the fifty
percent requirement, the court found that if every jurisdiction enacted such a
threshold requirement, the burden on interstate commerce would be apparent.'
56
Affiliated groups would be unable to offset profits collectively earned
by member corporations with the collective losses of the member
corporations. The groups would not have the benefit of decreased tax
liability or the administrative benefit of filing a single consolidated
income tax return. If all states applied the fifty percent threshold
requirement, business groups would be encouraged to perform the
majority of their business within a single state and would be penalized
for engaging in free trade. 7
The court concluded that the fifty percent requirement in Section
143.431.3(1) violated the Commerce Clause, and that the threshold requirement
could be severed from the rest of the statute 58 The statute now allows
151. Id. at 567 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 405-06
(1984)).
152. Id.; see also Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331
(1977) (holding that states may not tax interstate commerce to provide an advantage to
local businesses).
153. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 282-88 (1987).
154. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 567 (Mo.
1998).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 567-68.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 568.
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businesses to file a Missouri consolidated tax return if they file a federal
consolidated tax return for that tax year.'59
V. COMMENT
There can be no doubt that the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in GM
Corp. will significantly affect the way large affiliates like GM Group will file
their tax returns as well as the amount of taxes they will pay in Missouri.' The
decision therefore significantly affects the amount of taxing revenue Missouri
will collect each year from companies that transact business in this state. The
decision is also significant because it is slightly ahead of its time. Although the
decision is phrased as a prohibition on discrimination against businesses based
on geographic location and other factors, it actually eliminates an incentive to
conduct business in Missouri. This distinction should not be overlooked.'
A. The Enrich and Hellerstein Distinctions
Peter Enrich has remarked that "the states have enacted a vast array of tax
provisions that are designed to lure businesses to locate their facilities in the
state, and interstate 'bidding wars' offering tax breaks for major new facilities
have become commonplace."' 62 While the United States Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the specific claim that a State is actually competing for business
by offering location incentives, the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in GM
Corp. can be seen as a foray into this area.
It is true that the Missouri fifty percent provision is not a location incentive
in the sense that Enrich appears to contemplate. Nonetheless, the fifty percent
provision could be construed as an incentive or a "lure" to draw companies into
Missouri so that they might conduct more business activities here. The language
could be interpreted as follows: You will be subject to increased tax liability
only if the revenues you derive from Missouri increase. When the fifty percent
threshold is crossed, Missouri will allow you to file a consolidated return that
159. Id.
160. There can also be no doubt that this decision will cause much confusion at the
Missouri Department of Revenue given the amount of money in refunds and other
disbursements that will have to be paid. The Missouri Supreme Court did not address
the impact of this ruling in light of Missouri's reliance on Williams. The Court has now
done what it should have done in Williams. Depending upon the applicability of this
section over the next few years, this case may create a mess for Missouri's administrative
agencies.
161. See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. RuV. 377 (1996)
(arguing that the Commerce Clause should also bar a state from providing incentives to
businesses to locate within that particular state).
162. Id. at 380.
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will help offset your increased tax liability. In this sense, the fifty percent
requirement is an incentive for companies to transact more business in Missouri.
It is not necessarily a protective measure for Missouri businesses. Phrasing the
language of the statute in this way might change the fifty percent requirement
into a "constitutional carrot" as opposed to an "unconstitutional stick." Walter
Hellerstein has articulated what he believes to be a significant difference
between the "carrot" and the "stick."' 63 That is, Hellerstein has articulated what
he believes to be the true test of whether a tax provision violates the Commerce
Clause:
In my judgment, two core principles... underlie the Court's state tax
incentive decisions and should guide their proper interpretation. First,
the provision must favor in-state over out-of-state activities; second,
the provision must implicate the coercive power of the state. If, but
only if, both of these conditions are met, courts should declare the tax
unconstitutional. 64
Hellerstein believes that this formulation will catch tax incentives designed to
penalize business entities for conducting "targeted" activities within a state (the
unconstitutional sticks) but will allow states to reduce "additional state tax
liability to which the taxpayer would be subjected only if the taxpayer were to
engage in the targeted activity in the state."'165 In this way, one could argue that
Missouri, in Section 143.431.3, was simply attempting to reduce additional tax
liability for companies performing more activity in Missouri.' 66
163. See Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Tax Incentives,
82 MiNN. L. REv. 413, 414 (1997).
164. Id. at 424.
165. Id. at 425. Hellerstein states that in his "judgment, such incentives neither
favor in-state over out-of-state investment... nor do they rely on the coercive power of
the state to compel a choice favoring in-state investment." Id. The difference between
the carrot and the stick might be put another way:
[T]he "carrot"... offer[s] relief from additional tax liability attributable to an
activity in which the state is inviting the taxpayer to engage and the "stick"
... threaten[s] maximization of existing tax liability attributable to activity in
which the taxpayer already is engaged.
Id. at 428.
166. Hellerstein acknowledges that his distinction is somewhat tenuous. Id. at 429.
[Olne might say that there is no functional difference between the "carrot".
.. and the "stick".... Put another way, the distinction between selectively
forgiving taxes otherwise due if a taxpayer engages in in-state activity and
disclaiming the right to impose any taxes on a "virgin" tax base a state is
seeking to attract may be a distinction that turns entirely on whether a
particular taxpayer has previously engaged in some taxable activity in the
state. This may be too thin a distinction to carry the constitutional weight I
am asking it to bear.
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However, according to Enrich, Hellerstein's distinction between a carrot
and a stick is of no importance, and the Commerce Clause should be interpreted
in precisely the manner the Missouri Supreme Court has chosen:
The states' contemporary, destructive efforts to lure away one
another's businesses for their own economic gain are dishearteningly
reminiscent of the interstate economic frictions that took place under
the Articles of Confederation, frictions that were a major impetus
behind the Commerce Clause and, indeed, the entire Constitution.' 67
Thus, according to Enrich, both carrots and sticks should be viewed as
unconstitutional departures from Commerce Clause requirements, and courts
should rule as the Missouri Supreme Court did in GM Corp.
The distinction between carrots and sticks was not discussed in the Missouri
Supreme Court's opinion. Perhaps this is because the distinction really has no
meaningful constitutional importance. After all, the Court stated that the "form
by which a state erects barriers to commerce has no effect on the determination
of whether discrimination exists."16 However, it is clear that state and federal
courts will have to address Enrich's distinction as state legislatures find more
creative ways around some of the semantic requirements of the Commerce
Clause. Courts might also have to address this distinction when balancing the
United States Supreme Court's statement that states may "structur[e] their tax
systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and
industry"'169 within the strictures of Commerce Clause prohibitions.
Id. at 428-29. It is, however, outside of the scope of this Note to discuss his proposal at
length. Also, the provisions that he contemplates would be constitutional and the
Missouri provision are not truly analogous. Hellerstein's hypothetical "constitutional
carrot" is a property tax incentive that does "not favor in-state over out-of-state
investment and [does] not implicate the coercive power of the states." Id. at 438. He
recognizes that the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause precedent regarding tax
incentives prohibits any statutory tax regulation which renders companies unable to make
tax-neutral decisions. Id. at 421. But Hellerstein's distinction is a helpful tool for
understanding the subtle and somewhat unstable nature of Commerce Clause analysis.
For example, using Hellerstein's model and a slightly different interpretation of the effect
of the Missouri fifty percent statute might lead a court to a different result. This, in part,
may explain Williams. See infra notes 170-85.
167. Enrich, supra note 161, at 406.
168. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 567 (Mo.
1998) (citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc., v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994)).
169. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
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B. Overruling Williams Revisited
It is always interesting when a court reverses its own precedent, particularly
when the case reversed was only five years old. Decided in 1993, Williams held
that Section 143.431.3(1) did not violate the Commerce Clause.70 As we have
seen, the Court relied heavily upon Kraft in its determination that Williams is no
longer good law.'7' The Court's reliance on Kraft is not terribly problematic
save for the fact that Kraft involved the application of the Commerce Clause to
state taxation of foreign commerce 72 The United States Supreme Court
determined in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles73 that "the
constitutional prohibition against state taxation of foreign commerce is broader
than the protection afforded to interstate commerce... ,,"174 Since the Supreme
Court could limit Kraft to foreign commerce clause applications, the Missouri
Supreme Court could be criticized for relying too heavily on Kraft in overruling
Williams.
The general principle the Missouri Supreme Court derived from Kraft was
that "a statute that facially discriminates against interstate commerce" cannot be
saved "by showing that the taxpayer could have avoided the adverse
consequence of the statute by reorganizing its business or changing its
domicile." 75 Since the Williams court relied on this principle to save Section
143.431.3(1), Kraft made this analysis invalid in the court's estimation. 76
However, the Williams court distinguished Williams's situation from that
of the companies in Boston Stock Exchange177 or Westinghouse,'78 where the
companies were "additionally tax[ed] ... due to their interstate activities."'79
Rather, the increased tax in this case results from the fact that the
members of the group that generated losses and other tax savings are
incorporated separately from the Missouri subsidiaries. Many of these
subsidiaries did not file Missouri corporate income tax returns for the
years in question. 8
170. Williams Co. v. Director of Revenue, 799 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1990).
171. GM Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 566-67; see also Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa
Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
172. Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79.
173. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
174. Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79 (citing Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 445-446).
175. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 566-67 (Mo.
1998).
176. Id.
177. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
178. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
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Simple geographic relocation or a change in corporate structure would not
necessarily have allowed Williams to take advantage of Section 143.431.3.
Instead, geographic relocation or a change in corporate structure might have
allowed Williams to take advantage of some tax benefits, but not necessarily the
benefit available in Section 143.431.3. To take advantage of the statutory
provision, Williams would have had to change its customer base to Missouri in
order to derive more than fifty percent of its income from Missouri. The
Williams court concluded:
Disallowing consolidation of losses accrued outside Missouri with
profits generated inside the state when there is no clear nexus between
them (manifest by accruing under a single corporate franchise, or to a
group deriving the majority of income from sources within the state)
does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
This statement is relevant to the distinction noted earlier made by Enrich and
Hellerstein."' Instead of taxing Williams more because of its interstate
commerce activities, Section 143.431.3 in fact acted as an incentive for Williams
to conduct additional business in Missouri so that it could offset its losses from
other subsidiaries with profits made in Missouri. Thus, Section 143.431.3
discriminated against interstate commerce even before Kraft because it was an
attempt by Missouri to take commerce from other states. The simple fact is that
if Enrich's argument is accepted, Williams was decided incorrectly at the
outset. 82 The Williams decision can be seen as implicitly based on the
distinction between an "unconstitutional stick" and a "constitutional carrot.'
83
Section 143.431.3 did not discriminate against interstate commerce because it
did not increase tax liability for companies participating in interstate commerce.
But, the statute would decrease tax liability for companies willing to transact a
lot of business in this state-the "constitutional carrot."'
84
181. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
182. The difficulty with making this argument is that the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Williams. This strengthens the Missouri Supreme Court's claim that Kraft
really was a major change in the law. However, it might also be that the Supreme Court
was comfortable with the analysis used in Williams, which relied heavily on
apportionment and concluded that the provision was non-discriminatory.
183. Hellerstein, supra note 163.
184. The Court in GM Corp. seemed to speak of this when it stated:
If every state required affiliated groups to conduct a majority of their business
within the state before the groups could qualify to file consolidated income
tax returns, there would be interference with free trade .... If all states
applied the fifty-percent threshold requirement, business groups would be
encouraged to perform the majority of their business within a single state and
would be penalized for engaging in free trade.
General Motors Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561, 567-68 (Mo. 1998). In
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Following the court's decision in GM Corp., GM Group need not make any
changes in its corporate sales policies. All such tax incentives and burdens are
"unconstitutional sticks" in Missouri. Putting GM Corp.'s holding into
Hellerstein's formulation of the Commerce Clause test, the Court found that
Section 143.431.3(1) favored in-state over out-of-state activities and implicated
the coercive power of the state.1
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VI. CONCLUSION
GM Corp. stands as a clear statement against the "constitutional carrot."
The Missouri Supreme Court will not tolerate discrimination against interstate
commerce no matter the semantic formulation in which it may come. The
distinction that the Williams decision made (albeit implicitly) is removed and
Enrich's proposal may have to be implemented in future decisions. The court's
willingness to depart from precedent based on a perceived change in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is both refreshing and startling. It is refreshing because the
court was willing to correct itself. The court's review of Commerce Clause
precedent beyond Kraft suggests that it was cognizant (at least subconsciously)
of the fact that Section 143.431.3(1) was discriminatory at its inception. And yet
this decision is startling because of the court's willingness to overturn precedent
that was little more than five years old.
BRYAN D. LEMOINE
actuality, there would be no penalty for engaging in free trade unless all states truly did
impose this requirement. It might be more correct to say there would be no incentive to
engage in free trade.
185. Hellerstein, supra note 172.
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